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Overview
Research into cocaine use and abuse has overwhelmingly concentrated on processes and 
theories of addiction. This thesis is concerned with those theories and how stable 
recreational use of cocaine might be understood in the light of what is known about 
addiction.
Part 1 of the thesis reviews what is known about the long-term effects of chronic 
cocaine abuse. Developments in theories of addiction are discussed with reference to 
empirical studies assessing cognitive abilities, and to neuroimaging studies 
demonstrating neurological changes associated with substance abuse. The lack of 
research into social patterns of cocaine use is high-lighted. The review concludes that 
research into the effects of recreational cocaine is needed both to provide information to 
social users, but also to provide further insights into addiction processes.
Part 2 is the report of an empirical study into the effects of recreational cocaine use on 
mood and cognitive abilities. A mixed repeated measures and within subjects design is 
used to compare a group of 19 social cocaine users and a group of 19 controls on a 
range of cognitive abilities. Both groups were tested on two occasions. On the first 
occasion, cocaine users were tested shortly after self-administration of cocaine. The 
study provides tentative support for the hypothesis that controlled recreational cocaine 
use may lead to subtle impairments in response inhibition, and to increased sensitisation 
towards cocaine.
Part 3 is a critical appraisal of the process of conducting this research project. It 
includes a more personal reflection on my journey of learning both about the research 
process and about addiction and drug use.
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Part 1 
Literature Review
Processes of Addiction and Recreational Use of 
Cocaine
Abstract
This paper reviews recent gains in knowledge of addiction, with particular reference to 
cocaine. It starts by considering the history and prevalence both of recreational cocaine 
and chronic abuse. It goes on to describe what is known about acute cocaine action in 
the human brain, before reviewing developments in theories and models of processes in 
addiction. It concludes by discussing how current models do not yet account for 
ongoing, stable and controlled social use of cocaine, and suggests that tools used to 
measure inhibitory control and incentive sensitisation might be used to assess these 
attributes in recreational cocaine users in order to gain insights into controlled use as 
well as to further understandings of addiction processes.
Introduction
Cocaine use is increasingly widespread in modem society (British Crime Survey, 2003). 
Although there is much research about the effects of chronic dependent use, there is 
very little published literature on the effects of occasional, or recreational, use of 
cocaine. Use of cocaine is widespread in Britain and growing, particularly among young 
people. A prohibitionist society, while not effectively preventing use of illegal 
substances, is an environment in which myths and misinformation are fostered. Given 
the prevalence of recreational cocaine use, it is important for us to understand its effects, 
both for educational purposes and informed choice, and for the light it may shed on
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non-dependent use of psychoactive drugs. This thesis, therefore, focuses on the effects 
of recreational use of cocaine on mood and cognitive processes.
History of cocaine use
Cocaine is a drug obtained from the leaves of the coca plant, which grows in 
mountainous areas of South America. Coca leaves have been chewed and smoked for 
thousands of years by native populations but it was only during the 1880s that cocaine 
was isolated from the plant. Its most common form is a white crystalline salt, cocaine 
hydrochloride (See Figure 1), which is often seen as a powder and is usually ingested 
by insufflation or ‘snorting’ whereby it is absorbed through the nasal lining.
When snorted, cocaine is quick to take effect, and within a few minutes the user can feel 
euphoric, alert, more energetic, and with enhanced perceptions, so that sights, sounds 
and touch feel particularly vivid. The high from a single dose usually lasts between 15 
to 40 minutes. If crack cocaine is smoked the effect is more intense but shorter, perhaps 
lasting from between 5 to 10 minutes.
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Figure 1. Chemical structure of cocaine.
During the late 19th and early 20th Century cocaine was used medicinally as an 
anaesthetic and a tonic. Some commercial products had cocaine added to them, for 
example the wine Vin Mariani which was praised by Pope Pius X and the Grand Rabbi 
of France for its ‘life-giving properties’. Cocaine toothache drops were advertised not 
only for helping children with pain but for its ability to put children into a ‘better mood’ 
(Addiction Research Unit, University at Buffalo; see Figure 2).
1885 Advertisement for Cocaine Toothache Drops
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Figure 2. Advertisment for cocaine drops for toothache.
By the early 20th Century concerns were being expressed about cocaine’s potential to 
create dependency, particularly at the time of the Second World War. In 1916 an 
emergency law was enacted banning its possession and limiting its medical use.
Cocaine did not become widely used as a recreational drug until the 1970s. In the 1980s 
a new form of cocaine called ‘freebase’ or ‘crack’ was created by removing the chloride 
ion by ‘washing’ it with a solution of ammonia or bicarbonate of soda. This form is 
more easily vaporised and can therefore be smoked and absorbed more quickly via the 
lungs. It gives a more intense feeling of euphoria, which also lasts for a shorter time, 
and is more highly addictive.
Prevalence of cocaine use
Much of the information in this area comes from surveys commissioned and published 
by central government departments. The extent of drug use in the adult population is 
primarily measured by regular sweeps of the British Crime Survey (BCS; Condon &
4
Smith). The main findings from the BCS published in 2000 were that one third of those 
aged 16-59 had used an illegal drug, but in the younger age group of 16-29, half of the 
sample admitted to illegal drug use, 25% in the last year, with 16% in the last month. 
Cocaine use was reported by 5% of the sample overall, in the last year, a level similar to 
that of ecstasy use. However, among some geographical areas cocaine use was higher. 
For example, in affluent urban areas, such as London, cocaine use was reported by 11 % 
of the 16-29 year old age group. A report by the National Centre for Social Research 
(Boreham & McManus, 2004) presents data from a survey of over 10,000 school 
children aged between 11 and 15 conducted in 2003. One per cent of all children in this 
age group reported taking cocaine in the previous year.
Growth of use
Between 1994 and 2000, there was continued growth in cocaine use across all age 
groups, including 16-19 year-olds, where, between 1999 and 2000, use in last year 
increased from 1% to 5%. This is despite a fall in use of any drug in this age group 
between 1994 and 2000. In geographical terms, while use of cocaine was highest in 
London, its use was growing most rapidly in regional areas, especially in the North of 
England. The BCS (2000) reported a fall in amphetamine use by almost half in the same 
period, suggestive of the possibility that some people are switching from amphetamine 
to cocaine use. Use of ecstasy also started to fall slightly in 2003 (BCS, 2004). It may 
be that representations of ecstasy as dangerous and potentially lethal have been effective 
in reducing ecstasy use. However, it is possible that some young people have switched 
from ecstasy to cocaine as a drug of choice, as cocaine is seen as socially acceptable and 
less dangerous than other stimulants. Certainly, the 2003 BCS showed an increase in
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cocaine use alongside a small reduction in ecstasy use. Cocaine is now the second most 
commonly used illicit drug in England and Wales, after cannabis (BCS, 2003/4).
Teenagers in Britain have one of the highest rates of illicit substance use in Europe 
(Swedish Council for Information in Alcohol and Other Drugs (SCLAOD), 2000), and 
an increase in the number of people trying cocaine may be part of a general cultural 
change whereby experimentation with illicit drugs has become normalised. There is 
evidence that culture of ‘sensible’ (i.e. occasional and controlled) drug use is 
increasingly the norm among young people (Parker, Williams & Aldridge, 2002)
Prevalence of problem drug use
The most recent estimate of problem drug use in the UK relates to 1996. Frischer et al,. 
(2001) estimated from their findings that there were 266,000 problem drug users in 
England, Scotland and Wales in 1996. Cocaine increased as a main drug of use in those 
seeking treatment from 4% in 1995 to 6 % in 2001 (Dept of Health, 2002).
Mentions of cocaine on the death certificate in drug-related deaths, although still 
comparatively low when compared to opiates, increased seven-fold between 1993 and
1999 (Corkery, 2000). However, although it is not possible to distinguish between 
cocaine and crack cocaine in drug-related deaths, the rise in death rate seems to have 
been related to the rise in use of crack cocaine, rather than cocaine powder. Thus in
2000 the increase in drug-related deaths involving cocaine mirrored the increase in 
crack cocaine seized (BCS, 2000).
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Who uses cocaine?
Rates of use illicit drug use in general in Britain have traditionally been higher among 
young people, men, single people and frequent drinkers, while there is no significant 
variation associated with education or socio-economic status (Ramsay, Baker, Goulden 
et al., 2001). However the gender gap appears to be changing, and Sutherland & 
Shepherd (2001) found no gender difference on illicit drug use in the schools they 
sampled.
Consideration of the factors associated with illicit drug use gives some very general 
indicators of who might use cocaine. However, studies looking at factors associated 
with recreational drug use tend to lump illicit substances together (e.g. Coullthard, 
Farrell, Singleton et al., 2002; Sutherland & Shepherd, 2001; Wadsworth, Simpson, 
Moss et al., 2004). Although these studies give an indication of factors that make it 
more likely that particular individuals will take drugs, they do not tell us why people 
take specific drugs. What would be of interest are studies that enquire of individuals 
what factors led to their trying certain substances, what it is about the experience that 
leads them to continue to use, and what negative factors may be associated with drug 
use. Such understanding might lead to improved provision of education aimed at 
minimising risk of harm.
Action of cocaine 
Acute action
The mesolimbic reward pathway
The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is an area of the brain that is key to the experience of 
pleasure and reward. It is the end of the mesolimbic reward pathway, which is 
hypothesised to be the ‘pleasure centre’ of the brain, a central pathway for reward and
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reinforcement. It has been found to be activated by all types of reinforcing stimuli in 
animals and humans, for example, food, sex, and many drugs of abuse. Such stimuli 
produce increases in the amounts of the neurotransmitter dopamine released in many 
parts of the brain, and crucially, in terms of their pleasurable effects, in the NAc. When 
the mesolimbic pathway is stimulated, axons with terminals in the NAc release 
dopamine into the synaptic clefts, which are then received by neurons in the NAc thus 
activating the experience of pleasure (Stahl, 2000). Excess dopamine released into the 
synaptic cleft is reabsorbed by the pre-synaptic terminal.
Experimental evidence suggests that the greatest part of cocaine’s effect on behavioural 
responses is produced via its effect on dopamine. Cocaine binds to dopamine 
transporters, thus inhibiting dopamine re-uptake and increasing the amount of dopamine 
available at the synapse (Figure 3 ).
One of the areas in the brain that appears most affected by cocaine in acute 
administration is the ventral tegmental area (VTA). Axons from the VTA extend to the 
nucleus accumbens where cocaine binds with the dopamine transporter molecules, 
resulting in an increase in the amount of free dopamine available at the synapse to 
stimulate the receptor cells in the NAc. Studies using cocaine or cocaine analogues 
labelled with radioisotopes have also found high densities of cocaine binding to 
dopamine transporters in the caudate, putamen and nucleus accumbens in rats, monkeys 
and humans (e.g. Biegon et al., 1992; Staley, Basile, Flynn et al., 1994). These are all 
areas involved in the experience of pleasure and reinforcement. Horger, Valadez, 
Wellman et al., (1994) showed that cocaine can produce a 200% increase in 
extracellular dopamine in the NAc and the medial preffontal cortex.
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Figure 3. Cocaine blockade increases dopamine availability at D2 receptors in the 
nucleus accumbens.
A cute  a c tio n  in th e  fro n ta l co rte x
There is evidence of increased concentration of dopamine in frontal regions in acute 
drug intoxication (Goeders and Smith, 1986). Acutely, cocaine also causes increased 
tissue levels of serotonin in the preffontal cortex and hypothalamus (Yang, Gorman, 
Dunn, & Goeders, 1992), and chronically, in compensation, it causes an increase in the 
number of serotonin uptake sites in the preffontal cortex. The vasoconstriction in the 
frontal lobes that is seen in the brains of chronic cocaine users, as well as in acute use 
(Madden & Powers, 1990; Kaufman, Levin, Ross et al., 1998) maybe in part be due to 
increased levels of serotonin, which is known to be a powerful vasoconstrictor. Pre- 
ffontal activation, as seen in regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) scans during acute 
intoxication, is associated with the subjective perception of intoxication or ‘high’, one 
of the reinforcing effects of the drug.
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Long-term effects of cocaine use
Frontal lobe changes in chronic users of cocaine
Neuroimaging studies have shown morphological changes, such as volume loss, in the 
frontal lobes of people addicted to various drugs, including cocaine (Liu, Matochik & 
Cadet, 1998; Franklin, Acton, Maldjian et al., 2002), alcohol (e.g. Pfefferbaum,
Sullivan, Mathalon et al., 1997), and heroin (Liu et al. 1998). Chronic use of cocaine 
results in a decreased number of dopamine receptors in the orbitofrontal cortex and the 
cingulate gyrus. Positron emission tomography (PET) studies have provided evidence 
for dysfunction of the orbito-ffontal cortex (OFC) in cocaine-dependent individuals 
(London, Cascella, Wong et al., 1990).
There has been some debate about whether such changes precede drug use reflecting 
pre-morbid psychological characteristics that contribute to drug-experimentation or self- 
medication and are a vulnerability for drug abuse, or whether they are the result of long­
term use. Evidence for the latter is provided by studies that show a correlation between 
degree of volume loss and years of cocaine use (Liu et al., 1998).
Prefrontal volume loss has been hypothesised by Volkow, Fowler & Wang (2003) to be 
a result of the downregulation of these areas in response to repeated elevations of 
synaptic dopamine levels. Volkow, Fowler, Wolf et al. (1991) have also found that, 
while acute use increases prefrontal cortical blood flow, there is a reduction in rCBF in 
the pre-frontal cortex to below baseline levels in chronic users who are abstaining. This 
is not as paradoxical as it might seem, as it has been hypothesised to reflect chronic 
vasospasm in cerebral arteries (Volkow, Mullani, Gould et al., 1988).
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Addiction
In order to understand and explore the non-dependent use of cocaine it is necessary to 
understand the processes of addiction. I will therefore spend some time elucidating 
theories and concepts of addiction.
The term addiction is used widely in the literature despite the fact there is little 
consensus on what precisely it means. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word 
‘addiction’ as physical dependency on a particular substance. Until relatively recent 
years, addiction was thought to be the result of the highly pleasurable effects of a 
substance causing a person repeatedly to seek out the same experience until, over a 
period of time, tolerance develops. Tolerance results in withdrawal symptoms if the 
drug is not taken and it was once thought that this leads to an overwhelming urge to 
seek out and consume more of the drug (Dews, 1998). Cocaine was not initially 
considered a drug of addiction under these terms because it appeared to lack distinct 
physical withdrawal symptoms. However, chronic use can result in a strong 
psychological dependency (Gawin & Ellinwood, 1989). There is a vast and growing 
body of evidence of brain changes in chronic use (e.g. Volkow, Fowler and Wang, 
2003). Further, withdrawal after heavy use can result in severe depressive symptoms 
(Gawin & Kleber, 1986; Markou & Koob, 1991; APA, 1994) due to downregulation of 
dopamine and serotonin receptors in the mesolimbic system (Gawin & Ellinwood, 
1989). Thus, the distinction between psychological and physical dependence may not be 
as clear as was once thought.
Stahl (2000) defines addiction behaviourally, as a “pattern of drug abuse characterized 
by overwhelming involvement with the use of a drug (compulsive use) and with the
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securing of its supply and by a high tendency to relapse after discontinuation.” He 
distinguishes the terms ‘addiction’ and ‘dependence’, which he defines as a 
physiological state of adaptation necessitating continued use of a substance to prevent 
the appearance of withdrawal symptoms, within which he includes both the 
psychological and physical.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (DSM-IV, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) does not use the term addiction, and instead has two 
separate diagnostic categories. The first of these is ‘substance dependence’, and the 
second ‘substance abuse’.
Criteria for substance dependence are:
“A maladaptive pattern o f substance use, leading to clinically significant 
impairment or distress, as manifested by three (or more) o f the following, 
occurring at any time in the same 12-month period:
(1) tolerance [. . .]
(2) withdrawal [...]
(3) the substance is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period 
than was intended
(4) there is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control 
substance use
(5) a great deal o f time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the 
substance [...], use the substance [...] or recover from its effects
(6) important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up 
or reduced because o f substance use
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(7) the substance use is continued despite knowledge o f having a persistent 
or recurrent physical or psychological problem that is likely to have 
been caused or exacerbated by the substance [...]. ”
APA, 2000
Although the explicit tolerance and withdrawal items are not strictly necessary for 
a diagnosis, their presence may seem to be implied by the other items in any case.
If the criteria for substance dependence are not met, the diagnostic category 
‘substance abuse’ may be used if there is:
“A maladaptive pattern o f substance use leading to clinically significant 
impairment or distress, as manifested by one (or more) o f the following, 
occurring within a 12-month period:
(1) recurrent substance use resulting in a failure to fu lfil major role 
obligations at work, school, or home [...]
(2) recurrent substance use in situations in which it is physically hazardous
(3) recurrent substance-related legal problems
(4) continued substance use despite having persistent or recurrent social or 
interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the effects o f the 
substance ”
This definition makes no assumptions about the presence of withdrawal symptoms, 
tolerance or subjective experience of the ‘abuser’. It is an atheoretical diagnostic 
category. So recreational use of a drug, which does not lead to recurrent problems in the 
individual’s life would not be seen as abuse. Where the term ‘addiction’ is used in this
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thesis, it will be with the implication of dependence (whether physical or 
psychological), compulsion and craving.
Central questions for scientists involved in addiction research are:
■ How does dependence develop?
■ Which brain processes are involved?
■ How are abuse and dependence to be understood in terms of psychological 
concepts?
In an attempt to answer some of these questions, I will now give a brief overview of 
developments in our understanding of addiction. I will go on to consider neurological 
evidence, gained with the development of neuroimaging, and experimental evidence 
that has led to current understanding of contemporary models of addiction.
Developments in understanding of addiction 
Hedonic theories
Early models of addiction tended to focus only on the reward circuitry of the brain, and 
described models of addiction in terms of the pleasure of drug use being so great that 
once it has been taken, the individual compulsively seeks to repeat the experience. 
Hedonic theorists such as Gawin and Ellinwood (1989) explained addiction in terms of 
drug-taking being reinforced by intense euphoria, and the contrast with the dysphoric 
state in abstinence producing severe craving. According to this theory, as a person 
becomes tolerant to pleasurable effects, the lack of positive reinforcement would 
eventually lead to extinction of drug-taking if it were not for the negative reinforcement
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of the alleviation of withdrawal dysphoria. However, experiences of pleasure and 
dysphoria do not seem to be the only factors in the reinforcement of stimulant 
consumption, particularly as compulsive self-administration is seen in addicted 
individuals even when the experience is no longer perceived as a pleasurable one and 
may even be aversive (Fischman, Schuster, Javaid et al., 1985). Further, the experience 
of withdrawal symptoms are most intense within a few day of stopping the drug, yet the 
craving and susceptibility to reinstatement of drug taking continue for weeks and 
months ahead (Volkow & Fowler, 2000).
The hedonic theory has another flaw, which is that the pleasurable effects of substances 
can be experienced by novices as well as by chronic users, and, contrary to popular 
beliefs, addiction does not occur after a single use, even with the most addictive 
substances (though there is considerable variation in the rate at which individual 
animals and humans find cocaine rewarding -  e.g. Deneau, Yanagita, & Seevers, 1969; 
Davidson, Finch & Schenk, 1993; both cited in Schenk & Partridge, 1997).
Pleasure and reward circuits of the brain are a necessary and major part of the addictive 
process. This is because of their key role in determining which stimuli are 
unconditionally reinforcing and liable to contribute to repeated self-administration. 
However, they are not sufficient to explain addiction.
The role of environmental cues
Drug dependence involves complex interactions between biological, psychological and 
environmental factors. Empirical studies in humans and animals have clearly shown the 
importance of environmental conditions for cocaine’s reinforcing effects. Its
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behavioural effects interact with context, and contextual cues associated with drug- 
taking. Context is crucial in determining the strength and frequency of cravings. 
Leshner (1998) has given the example of US veterans returning from Vietnam addicted 
to heroin; they were relatively easy to treat and to keep from relapsing because the 
environment they returned to had very little in common with that in which they 
developed their addiction. This is in contrast to addiction treatments generally, which 
have poor outcomes and high relapse rates (Curran & Drummond, 2005) when patients 
return to the environments in which their addictions began and were continued.
By what mechanisms do environmental cues exert such a powerful effect? How do cues 
interact with psychological and neurological processes involved in the craving and 
compulsivity that characterise addictions?
Incentive sensitisation
Schenk & Partridge (1997) in their paper on sensitisation and tolerance, noted that 
repeated administration of stimulants increases the ability of subsequent exposures to 
act as positive reinforcers, and that after a history of repeated prior exposure, lower 
doses than those used initially were capable of maintaining self-administration (e.g. 
Woolverton, Cervo, & Johanson, 1984; cited in Schenk and Partridge, 1997). How does 
the development of increased reinforcement potency (sensitisation) at the same time as 
tolerance to drug effects make sense? Schenk and Partridge suggested that the 
phenomena both occur but in different phases of the process of drug-taking, affecting 
separate aspects of the phenomenon of reward. They suggested that once an individual 
is sensitised, administration of cocaine can elicit ‘cocaine-induced craving’, leading to 
compulsive bingeing, and that through associative processes, cocaine-related cues also
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take on the property of eliciting appetitive behaviours. Tolerance, on the other hand, is 
associated with the need for increased doses to produce the same conscious physical 
effects of drug consumption. Thus each of these phenomenon can both have an impact 
on the process of addiction.
Parsing of reward
Berridge and Robinson (2003) have made a detailed analysis of the psychological 
components of reward. They argue, with support from much empirical neurological 
evidence, that the concept of reward is comprised of three components: (1) learning, (2) 
pleasure and (3) motivation. Each of these components can be further parsed into 
explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) processes.
1. Learning
Unconscious memory includes those resulting from associative conditioning. 
Craving in drug use involves conditioned response learning and procedural memory, 
as well as conscious desire and cognitive imaging. Drug use can also be viewed as a 
habit, or action tendency. Both craving and habitual responding are powerfully 
affected by discriminative stimuli, i.e. environmental cues.
2. Pleasure
The affect component of reward -  the experience of pleasure -  is located 
neurologically in the NAc as has been noted above.
3. Motivation (or wanting) is closely related to liking, but dissociable from it. This 
dissociation has been demonstrated in the laboratory using conditioned incentive
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experiments (Robinson & Berridge, 2003; Wyvell & Berridge, 2000). The 
unconscious element of wanting is known as incentive salience, a concept first 
introduced into addiction theorising by Robinson and Berridge (1993). Incentive 
salience is an attribution that transforms sensory information about rewards and 
their cues (conditioned stimuli) into incentives to behavioural responses, that is they 
elicit appetitive approach (Berridge and Robinson, 2003). Drug cues (conditioned 
stimuli) can reinstate drug-taking behaviour by eliciting conscious wanting (craving) 
and/or unconscious wanting (incentive motivation). Thus cues trigger explicit and 
implicit memory associated with liking of a drug, and its incentive salience, i.e. the 
degree to which it motivates appetitive behaviour.
Robinson and Berridge have facilitated the understanding of the role of craving in drug 
dependence. They hypothesise that compulsive appetitive behaviour in cocaine 
addiction is the result of cocaine’s ability to increase the incentive salience of cocaine 
cues when it acts on the NAc, rather than its facilitation of the experience of hedonic 
reward (or pleasure) (Berridge and Robinson, 1998). This hypothesis has been 
supported by Wyvell & Berridge (2000) who have shown that amphetamine (a 
stimulant with a similar neurological effect to cocaine) injected into the NAc increases 
motivational behaviours in rats in the absence of hedonic enhancement. This effect is 
particularly characteristic of cocaine, as similar injections of opiates to the same area 
has been found simply to enhance the experience of pleasure (Dickinson & Dawson, 
1987; cited in Wyvell & Berridge, 2000). There is a positive relationship between a 
drug’s ability to reinstate drug-taking behaviour after abstinence and ability to induce 
psychomotor sensitisation (De Vries, Schofflemeer, Binnedake, Mulder, 1998; De
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Vries, Schoffelmeer, Binnedake, Raaso et al., 2002; De Vries, Schoffelmeer, 
Binnedake, Vanderschuren, 1999;). Therefore, Robinson and Berridge (1993) 
hypothesise that changes in the NAc that relate to psychomotor sensitisation may also 
contribute to the incentive motivational effects of the drugs.
Impulsivity and involvement of the prefrontal cortex
Clinical literature suggests that cocaine addiction is the result of a progression from 
casual, recreational use escalating to compulsive, uncontrolled bingeing, interspersed 
with periods of abstinence. Indeed, compulsive use, as noted above, is a crucial 
characteristic of all addictions. In cocaine addiction, the compulsive behaviour seems to 
be partly an effect of increased incentive salience of drug. However, in recent years, 
developments in technology, particularly in scanning and imagery, have led to a wealth 
of evidence pointing to the importance of other areas of the brain in the process of 
addiction besides the reward pathways of the mesolimbic system. Several theorists have 
put forward changes in the pre-ffontal cortex as an important element of the addictive 
process. Their models not only take into account the neuroimaging evidence for frontal 
lobe involvement, but also the perceived loss of control and compulsive intake that 
seem to characterise drug taking. Theorising of addiction has become concomitantly 
more complex as it has sought to incorporate this emerging evidence.
Role of the Prefrontal Cortex
The prefrontal cortex is known to mediate a range of cognitive functions that may be 
impaired through chronic drug use. It is involved in decision making, working memory,
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drive, motivation and inhibitory control (e.g. Royall, Leuterback, Cummings et al., 
2002).
The orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) is a region of the prefrontal cortex that processes the 
integration of reward, emotion and decision making -  all essential components of 
motivation-directed behaviour (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000; Rolls, 2000). It 
receives inputs from all the sensory areas and is linked to other prefrontal areas and the 
mesolimbic dopamine system.
Lesions in the PFC have been associated with impairments in inhibitory control, deficits 
in working memory and a tendency to respond for immediate, small rewards over 
delayed, bigger ones (Damasio, 1996) in other words, deficits in executive control.
Experimental evidence for executive impairments in cocaine addiction
Several researchers have found increased perseverative errors on the Wisconsin card 
sorting task in chronic cocaine users (indicating problems with inhibitory control), as 
well as impairments in delayed recall, and problems with maintaining attention and 
concentration (e.g. O’Malley, Adamse, Heaton, et al., 1992; Beatty, Katzung, Moreland 
et al., 1995; Rosselli & Ardila, 1996). These are all reminiscent of frontal lobe 
syndrome.
Fillmore & Rush (2002) examined general ability to inhibit pre-potent responses (i.e. 
not simply towards drugs or drug cues) in chronic cocaine users using the ‘stop-signal’ 
paradigm. In their task, participants were asked to respond to go-signals except when 
informed to inhibit response by a competing stop-signal. They found that cocaine users
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had impaired ability to inhibit responses compared to controls. This is in direct contrast 
to studies showing enhancement of response inhibition on stop-signal tasks under acute 
influence of stimulants (Feola, de Wit & Richards, 2000; Tannock, Schachar & Logan, 
1995). It it possible that a preceding deficit is a vulnerability for cocaine use, or that 
cocaine, which enhances response inhibition in acute use, leads to impairment in 
chronic use after repeated flooding and depletion of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex. 
In the context of evidence reviewed above from Volkow and colleagues, it is likely that 
there is a bi-directional effect, with deficits in response inhibition being a vulnerabity 
for cocaine use, and chronic use leading to further deficits in ability to inhibit the 
impulse to take cocaine, resulting in the comupulsive use seen in addiction.
Functional imaging and drug abuse
London, Ernst, Grant et al. (2000) have suggested that “addictive disorders reflect a 
dysregulation of the ability to evaluate potential reward against harm from drug self- 
administration”, in other words, a dysregulation of motivation-directed behaviour due to 
impairment in decision making. According to London et al. (2000), one component of 
motivated behaviour is expectancy, based on predictions of reward, another is 
compulsive drive (incentive motivation), which is linked to craving, and lastly there is 
decision making, based on a considered balance between expectation of rewards and 
losses. London et al. have considered imaging evidence for involvement of each of 
these components in chronic cocaine users (London, et al., 2000). They found evidence 
for impairments in decision-making that appeared to be related to the functioning of the 
OFC.
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Positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies have also provided evidence for activation of the OFC and its 
connections accompanying self-reported cocaine craving in experienced users 
(Childress, Ehrman, Rohsenow et al., 1992; Grant, London, Newlin et al., 1996.) 
Furthermore, self-reports of craving were positively correlated with metabolic increases 
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and amygdala, consistent with the function of the 
OFC in integrating information from the senses, episodic memory (dorsolateral PFC) 
and emotional coding (amygdala).
When craving was instigated by direct adminstration of a priming dose of cocaine to 
dependent participants in an fMRI study, it was associated with activation of various 
cerebral regions including the NAc, the amygdala and parts of the lateral prefrontal 
cortex (Breiter, Gollub, Weisskoff et al., 1997). The NAc was not shown to be activated 
in cue-induced craving, only in priming-induced craving. This difference could be due 
to the fact that cocaine-induced craving was associated with activation of the 
unconscious incentive motivation system (of the NAc), whereas cue-induced craving 
had a weaker effect on incentive motivation, but a strong effect on conscious craving 
associated with activation of the OFC. This idea is supported by the fact that even in the 
absence of acute administration, cue-induced craving in cocaine abusers is sufficient to 
activate frontolimbic circuits, as observed by various neuroimaging scanning techniques 
(Maas, Lukas, Kaufman et al., 1998; Garavan, Pankiewicz, Bloom et al., 2000; Wexler, 
Gottschalk, Fulbright et al., 2001).
Cocaine is not the only drug of abuse to have chronic effects on frontal regions of the 
cortex. Chronic exposure to cannabinoids, even when intermittent, can lead to reduced
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PFC dopamine transmission (Jentsch, Verrico, Le & Roth, 1998). Chronic heavy use of 
phencyclidine (PCP), opiates, cannabis and alcohol can produce profound disturbances 
in learning, working memory, and attention and inhibitory control, even after 
discontinuation of use. (Hooker & Jones, 1987; Cosgrove and Newell, 1991; Fletcher, 
Page, Francis et al. 1996; Pope & Yurgelun-Todd, 1996; Rogers, Everitt, Baldacchino et 
al., 1999). These changes are associated with disturbances in the dopamine circuits in 
frontal regions. Such evidence suggests that the frontal lobes are involved in addictive 
processes in general, not just in the abuse of cocaine.
Impulsiveness and aggression as factors in drug use
Volkow and colleagues have described drug addiction as “a disorder that results from 
the complex interplay of chronic drug administration and genetic and environmental 
variables.” (Volkow, Fowler, Wang et al., 2002).
Impulsivity and aggression are associated with the use of most psychoactive drugs. 
Cocaine has been related to aggression and violence in the epidemiological literature, 
(e.g. Chermack & Blow, 2002). Hoaken & Stewart (2003) have suggested this is 
because drug users are characterologically more likely to try new experiences, 
impulsivity and aggressive drive being associated with risk taking. It is known that 
children with externalising problems, including aggressive behaviour and conduct 
disorder, are more likely to have antisocial personality disorder and to become drug 
users in adulthood (Kellam, Ialongo, Brown et al., 1989). But could aggression also be 
the result of acute effects of the drug, or chronic neurotoxic effects, or of withdrawal 
during abstinence? Murray, Patkar, Mannelli et al. (2003) suggest it could. They found a 
positive relationship between both aggression and impulsivity with severity of cocaine
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use. Moeller, Dougherty, Barratt, et al. (2002) also found an association between 
chronic cocaine use and impulsivity that was independent of antisocial personality 
disorder or aggression suggesting that these two characteristics are not necessarily 
linked.
It is possible there is a bi-directional effect with aggression and impulsivity being 
predisposing factors associated with drug use, and drug use exacerbating aggression and 
problems with inhibitory control via frontal lobe damage.
Theoretical integration of prefrontal deficits into processes of addiction 
Inhibitory control
Jentsch & Taylor (1999) hypothesised that problems with inhibitory control, due to 
frontal lobe impairment, were an essential part of addiction. They postulated the 
existence of an inhibitory control mechanism by which higher mammals can suppress 
rapid conditioned responses and reflexes to pre-potent responses in order that planned 
behaviour, driven by slower cognitive processes, can take place. The decoding of the 
reinforcement value of previously neutral stimuli by learning their association with 
primary reinforcers, involves not only rapid learning but also rapid relearning and 
alteration of responses when reinforcement contingencies change (Rolls, 2000). Lesions 
to the ventromedial (prelimbic) frontal cortex, which projects almost exclusively to the 
NAc, and is intimately connected with the amygdala, result in impaired extinction of 
learned operant responding, leading to a continuation of inappropriate responding to no- 
longer rewarded stimuli (Jones & Mishkin, 1972; cited in Rolls, 2000). This is highly
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significant when we consider that addicts’ responses to drug cues can fail to extinguish 
even after many years or even decades of abstinence.
Volkow, Fowler and Wang’s (2003) model
One of the most recent models to integrate the role of the frontal lobes in the process of 
addiction is that of Volkow, Fowler and Wang (2003). Volkow and colleagues have 
reviewed numerous brain imaging studies and have found contrasting acute and chronic 
effects of addictive drugs. For example, in one of their own neuroimaging studies 
(Volkow et al., 2002) they found that while levels of synaptic dopamine were increased 
after acute administration of cocaine-analogous stimulant, there was a marked decrease 
in available dopamine in chronic users, which also continued long after their 
detoxification.
In a healthy person, acute intoxication is thought to involve the activation of several 
parts of the brain involved with reward, memory, drive (or motivation) and control. A 
visual representation of the model is presented in Figure 4.
Experience of reward is mediated by the nucleus accumbens (NAc) and the ventral 
pallidum; motivation is mediated by the OFC (and the subcallosum); memory by the 
amygdala and hippocampus; and executive control is located in the PFC and the anterior 
cingulate gyrus.
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Figure 4. Volkow et al. 's Model o f Addiction showing strengthened neural networks 
involving reward drive and memory, at the same time as executive control 
becomes weakened
On withdrawal there is initially a temporary decrease in dopamine availability to below 
baseline levels. With chronic use the baseline level of dopamine itself actually 
decreases. This is hypothesised to be due to the downregulation of dopamine receptors 
in reaction to the repeated increase of available dopamine (Volkow et al., 2003).
The lowered baseline of dopamine functioning with chronic use results in a decrease in 
the sensitivity of the NAc to natural reinforcers. This contributes to the need to take 
increasing doses of the drug in order to get a similar effect (tolerance). Impairment in 
PFC functioning leads to two main effects. Firstly, there is disruption of inhibitory 
control processes so that behaviour becomes more impulsive and immediate rewards are 
valued/sought out over long-term rewards. Secondly, there is an increase in the 
attribution of salience of the drug, so that it becomes more attention-grabbing than other
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natural reinforcers, which can no longer compete with the drug as viable alternative 
choices. With the decrease in dopamine functioning, there is a double contribution to 
the process of addiction. While other naturally reinforcing stimuli, such as previously 
pleasurable activities, become less subjectively rewarding, and therefore less able to 
compete with the drug, the executive system is less able to exert inhibitory control over 
impulsive behaviour. On top of this, repeated use strengthens memory traces and 
associations within the amygdala and hippocampus, such that the presence of the drug, 
or of its associated cues, results in over-excitation of reward and motivation circuits, 
while the inhibitory control system is unable to respond.
Measuring inhibitory control
The most common paradigm employed for measuring impulsivity is that of response 
inhibition tasks (Gondo, Shimonaka, Senda et al., 2000). One that has already been 
mentioned above is the ‘stop-signal’ paradigm, in which participants are required to 
respond positively to specific stimuli, but not to respond to the same stimuli in the 
presence of a stop signal. Such tasks, therefore, involve competing perceptual stimuli. 
As has been stated, Fillmore & Rush (2002), using a ‘stop-signal’ task, found chronic 
cocaine users to have impaired inhibitory control. Another method, is the occulomotor 
task used by Powell, Dawkins & Davis (2002), in which participants were required to 
inhibit reflexive saccadic eye movements towards visual stimuli associated with 
smoking. Those addicted to smoking but abstinent had poorer ability to inhibit reflexive 
eye movments towards the stimuli than both non-smokers and smokers who had just 
had a cigarette.
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More commonly used, are ‘go/ no-go’ tasks in which participants are required to 
respond positively to specific stimuli using computer keys or digital response boxes, 
and then, in further trials, to inhibit responses to stimuli that previously required a 
response. Several studies have used this paradigm to explore which brain regions are 
involved in inhibiting pre-potent impulses to respond (e.g. Casey, Tainor, Orendi et al., 
1997) all of which comfirm the the prefrontal cortex is the dominant area involved.
Measuring incentive motivation
Incentive motivation has generally been measured with the use of attentional bias tasks. 
The Stroop test in which participants are required to respond to the colour of presented 
words while attempting to ignore their semantic content has been used extensively (e.g. 
Sharma, Albery & Cook, 2001; Franken, Kroon, Wiers et al., 2000; Waters & 
Feyerabend, 2000). Colour responses are slower for words semantically salient for the 
participant. However, MacLeod (1991) has brought attention to the fact that it is unclear 
whether biases in Stroop tasks are due to interference activities in stimulus selection, or 
on response selection. In addition, as Jones, Jones, Smith et al. (2002) have commented, 
Stroop tasks are necessarily limited to word stimuli, when in many cases pictorial 
stimuli would be richer and more ecologically valid. The dot probe paradigm is one 
which overcomes both of these drawbacks. Although it can be used with words, the 
method lends itself to the use of pictures as stimuli. Two pictures are typically displayed 
briefly on a computer screen side by side, and are replaced by a single dotprobe in line 
with one of the pictures. Participants are required to respond to the probe as quickly as 
possible. Response times are faster to words or pictures that are particularly salient to 
the participant. The dot probe task has successfully been used to measure incentive
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motivation in opiate dependence (Lubman, Peters, Mogg et al., 2000), recreational 
cannabis users (Field, Mogg & Bradley, 2004) and nicotine addiction (Bradley, Mogg, 
Wright et al., 2003; Bradley, Field, Mogg et al., 2004).
Recreational Use
Very little research on recreational use of cocaine has been published. Recreational use 
of some other illicit drugs has been less neglected. For example, the mass of research 
into the effects of MDMA (‘ecstasy’) (e.g. Curran, 2000; Morgan, 2000) was driven by 
findings of neurotoxicity in animals. There has been some research into recreational use 
of cannabis (e.g. Solowij, 1998; Field et al., 2003), ketamine (Curran & Morgan, 2000) 
and alcohol. Bauer & Cox (1998) found attentional bias on the Stroop task in non­
dependent alcohol users. If attentional bias is a measure of incentive motivation, then 
this suggests that increased incentive motivation can be detectable in substance use in 
the absence of frank addiction.
Bradberry (2000) has investigated a model of ‘recreational’ use of cocaine in rhesus 
monkeys. Small doses, analogous to the amount human social cocaine users might take, 
where administered to the monkeys in weekly sessions. Extracellular dopamine levels 
were then measured using brain probes. Bradberry found that a single low dose of 
cocaine was followed by reduced responses to a similar dose later in the same session, 
suggestive of acute tolerance. He also found progressively higher levels of dopamine 
were elicited as the weeks progressed, indicating that a process of sensitisation was 
taking place. However, this was a measure of physiological sensitisation rather than 
behavioural sensitisation. He found that even a single low dose of cocaine reduced the 
brain's response to an identical dose of the drug taken later in the same day. Conversely,
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weekly exposure to low doses of cocaine made the monkeys' brains progressively more 
sensitive to the drug.
There are no theoretical models of the recreational use of cocaine. The effects and 
processes of regular non-dependent use may be somewhere between the two extremes 
of Volkow et al.’s model. If so, there should be some increase in salience attribution to 
the drug and its cues, and there should be some decrease in inhibitory control in 
recreational cocaine users. Incentive motivation and response inhibition have never 
been measured in non-dependent cocaine users. However, information about the effects 
of recreational cocaine use would be useful not only because users can be more 
informed about the benefits and risks of taking cocaine, but it might also provide 
insights into the process of addiction itself.
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Part 2 
Empirical Paper
Cognitive and Mood Effects of Recreational 
Cocaine Use
Abstract
The effects of acute cocaine self-administration in human participants was assessed 
by a battery of cognitive tasks and mood self-rating scales that were administered to 
19 recreational cocaine users and 19 controls on 2 separate test occasions 4 days 
apart. For the cocaine group, the first test sessions took place after cocaine had been 
taken in environments familiar to participants. Using a go/ no-go task and a dot- 
probe task, we found tentative support for small but detectable impairments in ability 
to inhibit response and an increased incentive sensitisation towards cocaine in the 
cocaine group. There was no evidence that working memory, focus of attention or 
speed of comprehension were affected by social cocaine use, either acutely or in 
abstinence. The cocaine group rated themselves as lower in mood and higher in 
anxiety and impulsivity, though whether these changes are a result of cocaine use or 
vulnerability for it is not determined in this study.
Introduction
There is a vast and growing body of research into the effects of psychoactive 
substances. Much of this has been into the processes and effects of addiction itself. 
Though some drugs, for example ecstasy, have received attention in terms of the 
acute and chronic effects of non-dependent recreational use (e.g. Vollenweider, 
Gamma, Liechti & Huber, 1988; Verheyden, Hadfield, Calin & Curran, 2002), for
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other drugs such as cocaine, the overwhelming majority of research has taken place 
in the context of chronic addiction.
Many areas of the brain are involved in experiencing psychoactive drugs (e.g. 
Jentsch & Taylor, 1999; Koob, 2000; Robinson & Berridge, 2003). In the last decade 
there has been a growth in our understanding of the nueural basis of addiction from 
functional brain imaging (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002). Initially, euphoric effects 
mediated, it is thought, by the prefrontal cortex and the nucleus accumbens, may lead 
to a desire to repeat the drug-taking experience, and are in this way an important part 
of reinforcement. However, other factors also come into play. While the consciously 
pleasurable effects of some drugs become attenuated with repeated exposure as 
tolerance develops, leading to the need for increasing amounts for the same effect, 
psychostimulants, a class of drugs which includes cocaine, also seem to be capable of 
causing sensitisation, whereby a small dose of cocaine can elicit increased appetitive 
behaviour for the drug. The co-existence of tolerance and sensitisation might, at first 
sight, seem to be paradoxical. However, Berridge & Robinson (1998; 2002) have 
hypothesised that motivation for a drug (or ‘wanting’), while closely related to 
pleasure, is dissociable from it. This dissociation has been demonstrated in the 
laboratory using conditioned incentive experiments with rats (Robinson & Berridge, 
2002; Wyvell & Berridge, 2000). The unconscious element of wanting is known as 
incentive sensitisation. Incentive salience is an attribution that transforms sensory 
information about rewards and their cues (conditioned stimuli) into incentives to 
behavioural responses, that is they elicit appetitive approach (Berridge and Robinson, 
2003). Drug cues (conditioned stimuli) can reinstate drug-taking behaviour by 
eliciting conscious wanting (craving) and/or unconscious wanting (incentive
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motivation). Thus cues trigger both explicit and implicit memory associated with 
liking of a drug, and its incentive salience, i.e. the degree to which it motivates 
appetitive behaviour. Once sensitised to psychostimulants, administration of even a 
small amount of cocaine (a priming dose), or conditioned cues, can cause the 
individual to be highly motivated to seek out more of the drug. The phenomenon of 
incentive sensitisation is now thought to be an important part of reinforcement in 
addiction.
While an individual in the process of addiction is becoming increasingly 
unconsciously sensitised to cues, conscious craving is also experienced, mediated by 
the preffontal cortex (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002). These processes work together to 
make drug cues highly salient so that they increasingly grab the individual’s 
attention. This powerfully increases the likelihood of further drug-seeking and self- 
administration.
According to Volkow, Fowler & Wang’s (2003) theory of substance addiction, in the 
early stages of repeated exposure to psychoactive drugs, executive functions 
(working memory, ability to switch attention, decision-making, and ability to inhibit 
impulsivity) are intact, and are able to override conscious craving and incentive 
motivation when it would be inappropriate or seriously detrimental for the individual 
to take drugs. Evidence from animal studies now suggests that, with more frequent 
and heavier use, the structure of frontal lobe circuits begin to alter in response to 
repeated dopamine flooding and depletion (Robinson, Gomy, Mitton & Kolb, 2000). 
In humans reductions in pre-frontal lobe functional activity have also been 
demonstrated (Volkow, Fowler, Wolf et al. 1991; Volkow, Hitzemann, Wang et al.,
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1992; Volkow, Fowler, Wang et al. 1993; London, Ernst, Grant et al., 2000) as well 
as reduced dopamine D2 receptor availability.
There has been much discussion about whether frontal lobe impairments precede 
psychoactive drug use and are a vulnerability for it, or result from neurotoxic 
damage. Pre-existing differences in frontal lobe function, and therefore of 
impulsivity and decision making could logically lead to increased vulnerability to 
addiction through reduced ability to inhibit responses and make profitable decisions. 
It is likely that there is, in fact a bi-directional process, with any frontal lobe deficits 
increasing vulnerability to addiction, and drug use contributing to further negative 
changes to the prefrontal cortex (PFC). It is now accepted that children with frontal 
lobe deficits such as are seen in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are 
more at risk of substance abuse and addiction in adulthood (Lambert & Hartsough, 
1998; Molina & William, 2003).
With advances in technology, it has also been possible to demonstrate evidence for 
PFC changes resulting from substance use (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Volkow, 
Fowler & Wang, 2003) with frontal lobe volume changes being proportional to 
years of drug use, and decreased D2 receptor availability in the PFC correlating with 
years of cocaine use (Volkow, Fowler & Wang et al., 1993).
Impairments in decision-making and impulse inhibition are particularly significant, 
as they directly contribute to a cycle in which internal or environmental cues activate 
drug-seeking via increased (unconscious) incentive motivation, and conscious 
craving, while the ability to inhibit response is compromised, leading to compulsive
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seeking-out and taking of drugs. At this point compulsive self-administration may 
continue even when the individual cognitively understands the disadvantages of 
continued use, consciously desires to stop, and no longer enjoys the experience per 
se, as opposed to the relief of suppressing withdrawal symptoms (Jentsch & Taylor, 
1999).
But how can ongoing, non-dependent recreational use of addictive substances be 
understood? In many cultures, alcohol is widely used in social settings, frequently 
quite heavily, while only a minority of people become addicted. It generally needs to 
be consumed in large quantities over a period of time before addiction takes hold, 
though there are individual genetic differences in vulnerability to alcohol addiction 
(Finn, Sharkansky, Viken et al., 1997; Heath, Bucholz, Madden et al. 1997; Long, 
Knowler, Hanson et al. 1998) and also differences in life experience that might lead 
to increased consumption of alcohol, or indeed other drugs, as a way of coping with 
negative affect.
Cocaine’s reputation as an addictive substance has varied over time. In the 1970s and 
early 1980s, it was considered by many to be a safe, non-addictive stimulant 
(Grinspoon & Bakalar, 1980; National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, 
1973). By the end of the 1980s, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) 
considered that there was a cocaine epidemic in the United States and that it was “the 
drug of greatest national public health concern.” (Adams & Kozel, 1985) while at the 
same time acknowledging that the majority of stimulant users manage to avoid the 
problems of dependence, even this was a problem by “promoting the illusion of 
safety” (Gawin & Ellinwood, 1989). There is plentiful evidence of widespread and
51
increasing social use of cocaine among the general population in Britain (British 
Crime Survey (BCS), 2003). In some affluent urban areas of Britain, as many as 11% 
of the 16-29 year-old age group report having used cocaine, and the number has been 
rising steadily over the last decade (BCS, 2003).
What effect is this social use of cocaine having on the cognitive functions and 
emotional well-being of those who take it? If addiction is characterised by 
disproportionately heightened incentive salience of cocaine and its cues, and an 
impaired ability to inhibit impulsively responding to such cues, is there any evidence 
of neuropsychological changes beginning to occur in regular recreational users? Is 
there a continuum from the cocaine-naive brain state to the addicted one, with a 
gradual change from social to compulsive use? Or is there a level of use which can 
be maintained without some ‘threshold’ for compulsion or disinhibition being 
reached?
To investigate these questions the present study was designed to test regular but non­
dependent cocaine users for incentive sensitisation and degree of impulsivity. To 
assess incentive motivation we used the dot-probe paradigm. This is a sensitive way 
of eliciting attentional bias and unconscious motivation towards particular cues. It 
has been used successfully to assess salience attribution in a variety of domains 
including anxiety, delusions and addictions (e.g. Taylor & John, 2004; Franken, 
Kroon, Wiers et al. 2000; Bradley, Field, Mogg et al., 2004).
To assess ability to inhibit prepotent responses, we used a go/no-go task, the most 
widely used paradigm to assess response inhibition and impulsivity (Rubia, Smith,
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Brammer et al. 2003). This paradigm is a selective attention task in which 
participants are required to respond to some stimuli and then instructed not to 
respond to certain stimuli under specific circumstances. Inhibitory difficulty is 
enhanced by weighting frequencies of stimuli so that the ‘go’ trials predominate and 
the ‘no-go’ trials are random and comparatively infrequent.
As incentive sensitisation is more likely to be elicited after a priming dose of cocaine 
(Robinson & Berridge, 2003), users were tested on a night when they were using 
cocaine. There is also anecdotal evidence that people believe cocaine can enhance 
cognitive functioning such as concentration, memory and speed of thinking. As there 
is a dearth of research literature on the general cognitive and mood effects of 
recreational cocaine use, we also decided to administer a range of cognitive tasks and 
self-rating scales in order to explore the general mood and cognitive effects of 
cocaine, and users’ beliefs about its ability to enhance cognitive functioning.
If recreational cocaine use induces subtle changes similar to some of the 
characteristics of dependent use, we would predict that: a) in the dot probe task, there 
will be reduced reaction times in cocaine users, compared to non-using controls, 
when the probe appears in the same areas as the cocaine-related pictures (a measure 
of increased salience attribution); b) cocaine users will have increased numbers of 
false alarms on the go/ no-go task (impaired response inhibition) compared with 
controls. On the other hand, if recreational use does not induce dependency-like 
changes, then we would predict no differences between users and controls on these 
tasks.
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Method
Design
A mixed independent groups, repeated measures design was used to compare 
recreational cocaine users with non-cocaine users at two time points: the night of 
drug use (day 0) and 4 days later.
Participants
Participants were recruited from individuals known to the researcher, and from their 
contacts, using the snowball method (Solowij, Hall & Lee, 1992), into either a 
cocaine group or a control group. The inclusion criterion for the control group was 
that participants must never have used cocaine, or have only tried it once, and not in 
the last year. However, they used other recreational drugs, including alcohol.
The study was approved by the local ethics committee and all participants gave 
written informed consent on both days.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were assessed on day 0 and again on day 4. On each day volunteers were 
tested individually in a quiet area. They were given written and oral information 
about the study, and each signed a written consent form on each test day. They then 
completed the tasks as described below. Participants were asked to take no illicit 
drugs between the first and second meetings. Different versions of the cognitive tasks 
were used on the two days and fully counterbalanced across groups and days. (See 
Appendix for the information sheet, consent form and upublished rating scales).
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Go/No go Task
This computer task was designed to assess response inhibition. Stimuli comprised 16 
letters of the alphabet organised into two sets of eight, and presented individually. 
There were 2 blocks of stimuli, the first of which consisted of 30 stimuli and the 
second and of 100 stimuli. For the first block, participants were instructed to respond 
by pressing a designated key on the computer keyboard, as quickly as possible, to 
each letter on the screen. In the second block participants were presented with 100 
stimuli, matched for frequency across versions, and were instructed to respond, by 
the same designated key press to all but two of the eight letters. These two letters 
constituted the ‘No go’ trials. Each letter appeared for 800 ms followed by an inter- 
stimulus interval of 500 ms. The proportion of ‘Go’ stimuli was 75% and that of the 
‘No go’ stimuli was 25%. All trials were presented on a 1500 MHz Intel Pentium M 
processor laptop with a standard keyboard and 12” screen. Error rates and reaction 
times were automatically recorded.
Dot probe task
The dot-probe task was modelled on that used by Bradley, Field, Mogg and De 
Houwer (2004). The present task was programmed by the author using DMDX 
programming software. 1 The stimuli consisted of 20 colour digital photographs of 
cocaine-related material (e.g. a line of cocaine with a rolled note) and 2 0  pictures not 
related to cocaine (e.g. a scribbled line with a ball-point pen), but matched as far as 
possible for composition to the cocaine-related pictures. Examples are seen in Figure 
1. An additional 6  pairs of non-cocaine-related pictures were prepared for practice 
trials. Each trial consisted of the appearance of a central fixation cross for 2000ms,
1 DMDX was developed by K. I. Forster and J.C. Forster at Monash University and at the Universtiy 
of Arizona.
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followed by a matched pair of pictures for 500ms. When the pictures disappeared, an 
asterisk appeared immediately in place of one of the pictures. Participants were 
instructed to press a designated key as soon as they saw the asterisk, which remained 
in place until the key was pressed. There were four blocks of 80 pseudo-randomised 
trials in which each picture appeared on each side with an asterisk ‘behind’ it 25% of 
the time. Response times and errors were automatically recorded.
F ix a tio n  c r o s s
P a ir e d  stim u li
R e s p o n d  t o  s id e  o f  a s te r is k
F ix a tio n  c r o s s
P a ir e d  stim u li
R e s p o n d  to  s id e  
o f  a s te r is k
Figure 1. Example stimuli for dot probe task
About 20 minutes after the dot-probe task, a Picture Rating sheet was given to each 
participant on which they rated all the pictures used in the computer task for how 
arousing and how pleasant they found them using a 9-point Likert scale. The pictures 
were presented individually in paper format
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Digits Forward and Backwards
This sub-scale from the WAIS III (Wechsler, 1997) was used to test working 
memory. A second version was prepared using pseudo-randomised numbers of 
sequences of the same length and in the same way as the WAIS III sub-scale.
Hay ling Sentence Completion (Burgess and Shallice, 1997)
This task was chosen as a measure of verbal response inhibition. In the first section, 
participants were read fifteen sentences each of which had the last word is missing 
(e.g. ‘He posted a letter without a ... ’). The participant was asked to give a verbal 
response to complete the sentence sensibly (e.g. ‘...stamp’), as quickly as possible. 
In the second section of the test the participant was again presented with fifteen 
sentences but this time was asked to give a response that did not make sense of the 
sentence and was not related to it in any way (e.g. ‘The captain stood on the 
sinking... keyring’.) The task yielded three measures, latency of response on section 
one (response initiation), latency of response on section two (response inhibition), 
and an error score for section two. Errors were recorded if the respondent completed 
any sentence so that it made sense, or with a word that was somewhat related to the 
content and meaning of the sentence. Errors were scored according to the Hayling 
Test scoring guidelines (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). As there is only one version of 
this task a second version was created on the advice of Dr Burgess (personal 
communication), by swapping the second set of sentences to the first part of the task, 
and vice versa.
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Speed o f Comprehension (Baddeley, Emslie & Nimmo-Smith, 1992)
This test of the speed of understanding of visually-presented verbal information 
comprised 100 sentences, half of which were true (e.g. ‘Buses have wheels’) and half 
false (e.g. ‘Tigers have fins’). Participants were asked to rate as many sentences as 
they could as true or false within 2  minutes.
Map Search from the Everyday Test o f Attention (Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway & 
Nimmo-Smith, 1994)
This was used to assess ability to focus attention. It is sensitive to visual selective 
attention deficit, i.e. the ability to pick out targets from a complex array of visual 
stimuli.
Self-rating Scales
The following list of pencil and paper self-rating scales was administered to each 
participant:
Metacognitive Estimates. This comprised 5 statements concerning estimates of 
current cognitive functioning, such as ‘My ability to concentrate right now is:’ 
followed by a 5- point Likert scale with ‘1 ’ labelled ‘Worse than usual’ to ‘5’, 
‘Better than usual’.
Subjective Effects. This comprised 9 possible ‘symptoms’ of cocaine use (e.g. ‘Heart 
beating fast/palpitations’), each attached to a visual analogue scale (VAS).
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The Mood Rating Scale (MRS; Bond and Lader, 1974), the Aggression Rating Scale 
(ARS; Bond and Lader, 1986), the Impulsivity Self Rating Scale (ISRS; Bond & 
Lader, 1974) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1978) were completed 
on each day of testing. The BDI was modified such that the instructions requested 
participants to rate how they had been feeling over the last 3 days (Curran & Travill, 
1997).
Additional tests on Day 4
On day 4, in addition to repeating all the above assessments, participants also 
completed the Spot the Word Test (Baddeley, Emslie & Nimmo-Smith, 1993; an 
index of premorbid IQ), the Barrett Impulsivity Scale (BIS; Barrett, 1985; a measure 
of trait impulsivity), the Aggression Questionnaire (AQ; Buss & Perry, 1992; a 
measure of trait aggression), and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, 1974), 
modified so that participants were requested to rate feelings over the last 3 days. A 
history of the frequency, amount and duration of all psychotropic drugs was taken for 
each participant. The cocaine group were in addition given a short interview about 
their experience of using cocaine, and screened for possible addiction, using the 
Severity o f Dependence Scale (Gossop, Darke, Griffiths et al., 1995).
Urine Drug Screen
Each participant provided a urine sample at the end of testing on both days, which
rr\M
was screened for the presence of illicit drugs using the CheckCup Immunoassay 
System for Drugs of Abuse. This system is capable of detecting the presence of very 
low levels of the following drugs or their metabolites: cocaine, methamphetamine, 
tetrahydrocannibinol, morphine, amphetamine and phencyclidine.
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Table 5. Mean (s.d.) metacognitive estimates (ratings 0 -  5).
Cocaine group Control group
N = 19 N =  19
Day 0 Day 4 Day 0 Day 4
Ability to concentrate 2.6 (1.2) 2.8 (0.7) 2.4 (0.7) 3.2 (0.8)
Ability to focus attention 2.7 (1.1) 2.7 (0.7) 2.4 (0.7) 3.2 (0.8)
Speed of understanding 2.9 (0.8) 2.8 (0.7) 2.7 (0.6) 3.1 (0.6)
Accuracy of thinking 2.9 (0.9) 3.0 (0.4) 2.7 (0.7) 3.2 (0.5)
Working memory 3.0 (0.5) 3.0 (0.5) 2.7 (0.7) 3.1 (0.3)
With five rating scales being analysed, the level of significance was set at p = 0.01. 
Only one of the self-rated estimates of cognitive functioning showed a significant 
effect: a main effect of day for ability to concentrate (Fi,36 = 8.33, p = 0.007), with 
both groups rating better concentration on day 4 than day 0.
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Subjective effects rating scale (Table 6)
Table 6. Means (s.d.) for Subjective Effects ratings (severity 0-100) and pulse rate.
Cocaine group Control group
N = 19 N = 19
Day 0 Day 4 Day 0 Day 4
Palpitations 47.2 (23.4) 8.7(13.6) 11.2(16.5) 7.6 (12.6)
High temperature 29.0 (30.4) 5.9 (9.4) 5.6(15.7) 3.3 (6.4)
Shaking 32.5 (27.5) 3.4 (4.7) 7.6(15.5) 2.8 (6.4)
Sweating 14.7(20.6) 11.6(16.7) 5.1 (15.4) 3.1 (3.8)
Teeth tingling or numb 59.3 (25.5) 2.1 (2.3) 1.0 (1.9) 1.6 (3.0)
Nausea 8.4(15.2) 2.1 (2.4) 6.5 (17.4) 1.7 (3.1)
Muscle cramps 6.6(18.4) 4.3 (10.9) 1.4 (2.3) 1.6 (3.0)
High or ‘rushing’ 54.3 (24.0) 4.3 (8 .6 ) 3.7(11.2) 1.8 (3.1)
Desire for cocaine 61.5 (36.5) 23.8(31.7) 0.3 (0.9) 0.7 (1.9)
Pulse (beats/minute) 92.3 (18.2) 72.8(15.1) 67.8 (12.0) 66.0 (9.5)
As nine different visual analogue scales rating subjective sensations were analysed, 
the level of significance was set at p = 0.007 to adjust for increased family-wise error 
rates. There was a significant group x day interaction for ratings of palpitations (F13 4  
= 32.1, p < 0 .0 0 1 ), high temperature (Fi,35 = 12.3, p = 0 .0 0 1 ), shaking (Fi,33 = 16.5, p 
< 0.001) and ‘rushing or high’ (Fi,35 = 81.5, p < 0.001). On all of these, the cocaine 
group’s ratings were higher than the controls only on day 0. For sweating there was
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only a main effect of group (Fi,35 = 12.3, p = 0.001), with the cocaine group having 
higher ratings on both days.
Desire for cocaine were at floor in controls but significantly higher in the cocaine 
group on day 0 than day 4 (tig = 3.9, p = 0.001). Ratings for ‘teeth tingling or numb’ 
were again at floor in controls but significantly higher in the cocaine group on day 0  
than day 4 (tig = 10.3, p < 0.001). A visual presentation of comparison of mean 
ratings is seen in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Mean ratings for: (A) severity of palpitations; (B) desire for cocaine.
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There were no significant group or day differences on ratings of muscle cramps or 
nausea.
There was a significant day x group interaction for pulse rate (Fi,36 = 20.7, p<0.001), 
and main effects for both day (Fi,36 = 20.7, p<0 001) and group (Fi,36 = 16.0, 
p<0.001) with elevated pulse rates of the cocaine group only on day 0 (Figure 5). 
Group means for pulse rate can be seen in Table 6.
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Figure 5. Group mean pulse rates
M e asu re s  o f m ood  a n d  s ta te  (Table 7)
Mood Rating Scale
There were no significant differences in sedation or discontentedness. There was a 
significant group x day interaction for anxiety (Fi;34 = 8.1, p = 0.008), and a main 
effect of day (F13 4  = 18.1, p < 0 .0 0 1 ), with higher levels of anxiety rated by the 
cocaine group on day 0  as seen in Figure 6 .
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Table 7. Group means (s.d.) for the MRS, BDI, ISRS, BIS, AQ & BAI
Cocaine group Control group
N = 19 N = 19
Day 0  Day 4 Day 0 Day 4
MRS: Sedation 31.0(14.6) 35.8 (19.4) 36.2(18.8) 25.9(14.3)
Discontent 26.4(15.5) 32.4 (16.9) 28.1 (19.4) 26.3 (17.1)
Anxiety 56.8(21.5) 32.3 (19.0) 32.8 (22.4) 28.5 (21.0)
BDI: Somatic 3.3 (2.8) 2.2 (1.5) 1.7 (1.8) 1 . 2  ( 1 .8 )
Non-somatic 6.6(65) 3.6 (2.9) 2.9 (3.8) 2.4 (3.8)
Total 9.9 (8.2) 5.7 (3.9) 5.8 (8.5) 4.7 (7.2)
ISRS 52.9(11.6) 29.5(13.1) 38.0(14.6) 30.6(17.2)
ARS 29.4 (14.3) 23.9(12.8) 20.8(15.2) 19.9(16.6)
BIS: Non-planning - 26.7 (4.4) - 25.1 (4.2)
Motor - 23.2 (5.3) - 21.7(3.8)
Attention - 18.4 (3.3) - 15.6(2.4)
AQ - 94.1 (22.7) - 78.3 (19.3)
BAI - 7.3 (5.4) - 4.5 (4.9)
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
There was no interaction for BDI total scores, but there was a main effect of group 
(Fi,3 4 = 6 .0 , p = 0 .0 2 ), with the cocaine group reporting lower mood overall than the 
control group. There was also a main effect of day (Fi,34 = 6 .8 , p = 0.013) with higher 
scores on day 0 .
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In terms of the somatic symptoms component, there were again main effects of group 
(Fi,34 = 9.3, p = 0.004), and day (Fi,34 = 6 .6 , p = 0.015) with the cocaine group 
reporting more symptoms than the control group, particularly on day 0. For the non- 
somatic symptoms, there was only an main effect of day (F1 3 4  = 4.6, p = 0.04). 
Figure 7 shows a comparison of group means for total BDI scores on day 0 and 4.
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Figure 7. Group mean totals on the BDI 
Impulsivity State Rating Scale (ISRS)
For ISRS scores there was a significant group x day interaction (Fi,36 = 13.3, p = 
0.001), and a main effect of day (Fij36= 50.0, p < 0.001). As can be seen in Figure 8 , 
the cocaine group had higher self-ratings on day 0 .
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Figure 8. Mean ISRS scores
Aggression Rating Scale (ARS)
Scores on the aggression rating scale did not show any statistically significant 
effects.
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI)
There were no significant differences on the BAI.
Trait m e a s u re s
Barrett Impulsivity Scale (BIS)
As the total score and 3 sub-scales were all analysed using independent samples t- 
tests, the significance level was set at p = 0.01. When total BIS scores were 
compared, the cocaine group did not rate themselves as significantly more impulsive. 
Analysis of the sub-scales showed a difference only on the attentional sub-scale (t36 = 
2.9, p = 0.006), with the cocaine group reporting more problems keeping attention on 
activities.
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Aggression Questionnaire
The cocaine group rated themselves as significantly more aggressive on the AQ than 
controls (t3 6 = 2.32, p = 0.026).
Discussion
As far as we are aware, this is the first study to assess the cognitive and mood effects 
of recreational cocaine use, and to explore whether users show mild forms of the 
cognitive changes that characterise addiction, viz increased incentive motivation 
towards cocaine, difficulties with response inhibition, and impairments in specific 
executive functions.
It was an opportunistic study with ecological validity in assessing recreational users 
in the context of their normal intake of the drug in their preferred environment. On 
day 0, the cocaine group had taken relatively small amounts of cocaine which were 
enough to elicit clear subjective effects and physiological changes not seen in 
controls. The increased pulse rate, the subjective rush/high and the greater desire for 
more cocaine all suggested that cocaine was taken by users on day 0. This was 
objectively verified by urine screens showing cocaine in the user group but not 
controls on day 0.
Response inhibition
Impairments in response inhibition are an important part of the process of addiction 
(Robinson & Berridge, 2002). Anecdotal evidence suggests that recreational cocaine 
users, if not generally suffering with overt problems of impulsivity, sometimes find it 
hard to stop taking cocaine once they have taken an initial dose. Indeed, subjective
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ratings showed a significantly increased desire for cocaine following use of the drug 
on day 0. We attempted to test whether recreational users have difficulties with 
impulsivity in terms of inhibiting pre-potent responses using two separate paradigms 
-  a go/no-go task and the Hayling Sentence Completion.
On the go/no-go task, while the control group improved slightly with practice, the 
cocaine group showed the opposite direction of change, with fewer false alarms 
when under acute intoxication than on day 4. This pattern suggests that cocaine had a 
facilitative impact acutely, in line with what is known about cocaine’s effect on the 
dopamine circuits in the PFC (White & Kalivas, 1998), an area involved in inhibition 
of responses (Jentsch & Taylor, 1999; Volkow, Fowler & Wang, 2003). Poorer 
inhibition of the cocaine group, when not under its acute influence, is suggestive of 
some impairment of response inhibition, which may be due to repeated dopamine 
flooding and depletion.
If this is the case, why was there no sign of impairment in the cocaine group on the 
Hayling Sentence Completion? One possible explanation is that the Hayling is not a 
sensitive enough measure for what could be very subtle changes. The other is the 
varying strategies that participants reported using on this task during debriefing. 
Some had found that looking around the room, they prepared themselves simply to 
name an object in the room whatever the sentence. Testing took place in people’s 
home environments, which were usually rich in possibilities, and such preparation 
was facilitated by the tester’s need to write down response times between sentences. 
Such a strategy could easily be countered by use of a blindfold. No doubt such a 
move would make it much harder to disinhibit a prepotent response. However,
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another strategy used by some participants was to think of a category of objects and 
keep listing items in that group whatever the sentence. This strategy would not be so 
easy to overcome. It is likely that the use of such strategies masked any influence of 
acute cocaine. Such strategies are unlikely to affect the go/ no-go task.
Incentive Motivation
Increased incentive motivation is an important factor in addictive processes 
(Robinson & Berridge, 2003). The dot probe task has successfully demonstrated 
significant differences in incentive motivation in people addicted to cigarettes 
(Bradley, Mogg, Wright et al., 2003; Bradley, Field, Mogg et al., 2004; Ehrman, 
Robbins Bromwell et al., 2002). In our study, cocaine users did show increased 
reaction times to the probe when it was preceded by a cocaine cue, suggesting 
increased motivation towards cocaine cues. However, the control group also showed 
this tendency. The most obvious explanation for this is that cocaine pictures were 
more attention grabbing than non-cocaine pictures to both groups. Explicit 
representations of cocaine cues and scenes of cocaine taking are relatively unusual, 
especially when compared to representations of smoking and drinking-related scenes. 
Cocaine use is also an illicit activity, with actual cocaine use taking place largely 
hidden from public view, thus making such scenes relatively novel and interesting.
In order to assess the impact of the pictures other than incentive motivation, all 
participants were asked to rate each picture for how pleasurable and arousing they 
found it. The cocaine group rated the cocaine pictures as more arousing and more 
pleasurable both than the non-cocaine pictures and the control group. Further, they 
rated the cocaine pictures as more arousing and pleasurable on day 0  than they did on
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day 4. Controls showed no difference in ratings of cocaine and non-cocaine pictures 
whilst cocaine users rated cocaine pictures higher on both days. Although some of 
the day effect may have been due to desensitisation, this cannot be the only 
explanation as there was no significant day effect for the control group on arousal or 
pleasure ratings.
These results suggest that cocaine cues have increased salience for recreational users 
at a conscious level, and that this salience is further increased under acute use, even 
when that use is a small ‘priming’ dose. During interview about their use some 
people spontaneously referred to both conscious and unconscious increased appetite 
for cocaine when they had taken even a small amount. For example, one said, “The 
first line does it -  after that I can’t stop myself.” This is highly suggestive of an 
incentive sensitisation effect.
Other cognitive tasks
The results of metacognitive ratings by participants in this study do not accord with 
the commonly held belief that people take cocaine to enhance their ability to work. 
There was no evidence cocaine users had any inflated beliefs about cocaine’s 
capacity to enhance cognitive abilities. On average, cocaine users tended to rate their 
abilities as the same or slightly worse than usual, as did the control group. Overall, 
reporteing of attentional abilities was slightly lower on day 0 than day 4. This was 
largely due to the control group reporting better attentional focus on the second test 
day, and therefore does not appear to be linked to cocaine use. Interestingly, the 
attentional subscale of the Behavioural Inhibition Scale showed cocaine users rated 
more problems maintaining attentional focus than controls.
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There was no evidence of actual group or day differences in working memory (digit 
span), focus of attention (map search), and speed of comprehension. In view of the 
greater self-reporting of inattention of the cocaine group on the BIS, we might have 
expected a group difference on this task. The fact that no significant difference was 
found, however, may be explained with references to the task and again to shades of 
different meaning in use of the term inattention. Questions on the BIS in the 
inattention subscale tend to be about whether the respondent can stay on tasks and 
finish things they start. But there are other reasons for leaving things unfinished apart 
from lack of attentional focus, for example confidence, boredom, or lack of 
motivation.
In addition, the map search not only measures ability to focus attention, but also 
speed of responding. Groups were well matched for age and intellectual ability, but 
both groups consisted of highly intelligent samples, and this resulted in something of 
a ceiling effect in both the map search and the Speed of Comprehension test. Any 
subtle group or day differences may have been more difficult to detect in such 
circumstances.
Mood and state effects
In terms of mood, the cocaine group reported more symptoms of depression, 
particularly of somatic symptoms, over the three days preceding both test points. 
These elevations could be due to effects of drug taking, whether cocaine or polydrug 
abuse. On the other hand, they may suggest a form of self-medication of cocaine for
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pre-existing symptoms. On day 0, seven individuals in the cocaine group scored over 
14 points on the BDI compared to only 1 control.
The results of the Mood Rating Scale (MRS) suggested the control group had a 
higher level of anxiety on day 0. This could be due to the acute effects of cocaine 
which also caused shaking, palpitations, increased pulse and temperature -  all also 
symptoms of anxiety. There was also a non-significant suggestion from the BAI 
scores that the cocaine group suffered greater somatic symptoms of anxiety in the 3 
days between tests. These symptoms could have been due to cocaine withdrawal, but 
the cocaine group also took a higher number of drugs between testing on day 0 and 
day 4, and the somatic symptoms may rather be related to other drug use.
The cocaine group rated themselves as feeling more impulsive on the ISRS on day 0 
than on day 4, and more impulsive on day 0 than the control group, while there was 
no group difference in ratings on day 4. This suggests that cocaine users feel 
significantly more impulsive when under the influence of cocaine, even though this 
was not demonstrated in the objective tasks. The reason for this may be that ISRS 
items are measuring different aspects of impulsivity, ie. feelings of agitation, 
impatience, and inattention, rather than ability to inhibit specific responses.
Inattention was the one factor of the BIS on which the cocaine group rated 
themselves significantly more highly. There are a number of studies linking cocaine 
addiction to problems of impulsivity and attention (Jentsch & Taylor, 1999; Volkow, 
Fowler & Wang, 2003). It is not clear whether that is the result of cocaine addiction 
or one of its determinants, and it may be that there is an interactive process with
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elements of both occurring. The higher self-rating of trait inattention in the present 
study is in line with the hypothesis that aspects of trait impulsivity and difficulties 
with inattention are characteristics that make illicit drug use more likely. It is 
interesting to note that in children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
methylphenidate, a stimulant in the same class as cocaine, can improve attention and 
reduce behavioural impulsivity. There is evidence that children with ADHD are more 
likely to have drug problems as adults (Lambert & Hartsough, 1998; Molina & 
William, 2003). A question raised by the results of the go/ nogo task in the present 
study is whether higher incidence of illicit stimulant taking in individuals with 
attentional problems such as ADHD are a result of self-medication, risk-taking 
behaviour, or the greater vulnerability to addictive processes given predisposing 
impairments in response inhibition.
Although there were no significant differences in self-rating on the Aggression 
Rating Scale (ARS), a tool for measuring state aggression, the cocaine group rated 
themselves as more highly aggressive on each of the subscales of the Aggression 
Questionnaire (AQ), a trait measure, with significantly higher total scores than the 
controls. These results suggest a possible association between aspects of trait 
aggression and substance use. The amounts of cocaine taken before testing were 
relatively small, and larger amounts may result in more marked differences.
Summary
This study provides tentative support for the hypothesis that recreational cocaine use 
can lead to small but detectable impairments in response inhibition, and some degree 
of incentive sensitisation. There was no evidence of cocaine affecting other cognitive
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abilities tested in this study. However, the doses taken were small compared to usual 
amounts taken over a social evening, and both groups were of well above average 
intellectual functioning, which led to some ceiling effects and therefore lack of 
sensitivity of the testing.
The cocaine group were lower in mood, and higher in anxiety, self-rated impulsivity 
and aggression than controls. Whether these characteristics are due to cocaine use, 
other drug use or precede drug use and are a vulnerability for it is a question that 
needs addressing in a prospective, longitudinal study.
References
Adams, E., H. & Kozel, N. J., (Eds.) (1985). Cocaine use in America: introduction 
and overview. In: NIDA research monograph series, Vol. 61. Cocaine use in 
America: epidemiologic and clinical perspectives, 35-49. Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office.
Baddeley, A. D., Emslie, H. & Nimmo-Smith, I. (1992). The Speed and Capacity of 
Language Processing (SCOLP) Test. Bury St. Edmund’s: Thames Valley 
Test Co.
Baddeley, A. D., Emslie, H. & Nimmo-Smith, I. (1993). The Spot-the-Word test: a 
robust estimate of verbal intelligence based on lexical decision. British 
Journal o f Clinical Psychology, 32 (1), 55-65.
85
Barrett, E. S. (1985). Impulsive subtraits: arousal and information processing. In:
Spence, J. T., Izard, C. E. (Eds). Motivation, emotion and personality. North- 
Holland: Elsevier Science.
Berridge, K. C. & Robinson, T. E. (1998). What is the role of dopamine reward:
hedonic impact, reward learning, or incentive salience? Brain Research 
Review, 28, 309-369.
Berridge, K. C. & Robinson, T. E. (2003). Parsing reward. Trends in neuroscience, 9, 
507-513.
Bond, A. J. & Lader, M. (1974). The use of analogue scales in rating subjective 
feelings. British Journal o f Medical Psychology, 47, 211-218.
Bond, A. J., Lader, M. H. (1986). A method to elicit aggressive feelings and 
behaviour via provocation. Biological Psychology, 22, 69-79.
Bradley, B., Field, M., Mogg, K. & De Houwer, J. (2004). Attentional and evaluative 
biases for smoking cues in nicotine dependence: component processes of 
biases in visual orienting. Behavioural Pharmacology, 15, 29-36.
Bradley, B. P., Mogg, K., Wright, T. & Field, M. (2003). Attentional bias in drug 
dependence: vigilance for cigarette-related cues in smokers. Psychology o f 
Addictive Behaviors, 17, (1)66-72.
86
Burgess, P. W. & Shallice, T. (1997). Hayling Sentence Completion Test. Suffolk: 
Thames Valley Test Co. Ltd.
Buss, A. H. & Perry, M. (1992). The aggression questionnaire. Journal o f 
Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 452-459.
Curran, H. V. & Travill, R. A. (1997). Mood and cognitive effects of +/-3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, ‘ecstasy’): week-end ‘high’ 
followed by mid-week low. Addiction, 92, 821-831.
Ermann, R. N., Robbin, S. J., Bromwell, M. A., Lankford, M. E., Monterosso, J. R. 
& O’Brien, C. P. (2002). Comparing attentional bias to smoking cues in 
current smokers, former smokers, and non-smokers using a dot-probe task. 
Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 67, (2) 185-191.
Finn, P. R., Sharkansky, E. J., Viken, R , West, T. L., Sandy, J., & Bueffered, G. M. 
(1997). Heterogeneity in the families of sons of alcoholics: The impact of 
familial vulnerability type on offspring characteristics. Journal o f Abnormal 
Psychology 106, (1) 26-36.
Franken, I. H. A., Kroon, L. Y., Wiers, R. W. & Jansen, A. (2000). Selective 
cognitive processing of drug cues in heroin dependence. Journal o f 
Psychopharmacology 14 (4), 395-400.
Gawin, F., H. & Ellinwood, E. H. (1989). Cocaine dependence. Annual Review o f 
Medicine, 40, 149-61.
Goldstein, R. Z. & Volkow, N. D. (2002). Drug addiction and its underlying
neurobiological basis: neuroimaging evidence for the involvement of the 
frontal cortex. American Journal o f Psychiatry, 159, 1642-1651.
Gossop, M., Darke, S., Griffiths, P., Hando, J., Powis, B., Hall, W. & Strang, J.
(1995). The Severity of Dependence Scale (SDS): psychometric properties of 
the SDS in English and Australian samples of heroin, cocaine and 
amphetamine users. Addiction, 90, 607-14.
Heath, A. C., Bucholz, K. K., Madden, P. A., Dinwiddie, S. H„ Slutske, W. S.,
Bierut, L. J., Statham, D. J., Dunne, M. P., Whitfield, J. B., & Martin, N.G. 
(1997). Genetic and environmental contributions to alcohol dependence risk 
in a national twin sample. Consistency of findings in women and men. 
Psychology and Medicine 27, 1381-1396.
Jentsch, J. D. & Taylor, J. R. (1999). Impulsivity resulting from frontostriatal
dysfunction in drug abuse: implications for the control of behavior by reward- 
related stimuli. Psychopharmacology, 146, 373-390.
Koob, G. I. (2000). Neurobiology of Addiction. Toward the Development of New 
Therapies. Annals o f the New York Academy o f Sciences, 909, 170-185.
Lambert, N. M. & Hartsough, C. S. (1998). Prospective study of tobacco smoking
88
and substance dependencies among samples of ADHD and non-ADHD 
participants. Journal o f Learning Disabilities, 31, 533-44.
Long, J. C., Knowler, W. C., Hanson, R. L., Robin, R. W., Urbanek, M., Moore, E., 
Bennett, P. H. & Goldman, G. (1998). Evidence for genetic linkage to alcohol 
dependence on chromosomes 4 and 11 from an autosome-wide scan in an 
American Indian population. American Journal o f Medicine and Genetics 81, 
216-221.
Molina, B. S. G. & Pelham, W. E. (2003). Childhood Predictors of Adolescent
Substance Use in a Longitudinal Study of Children With ADHD. Journal o f 
Abnormal Psychology, 112, 497-507.
Robertson, I. H., Ward, T., Ridgeway, V. & Nimmo-Smith, I. (1994). The Test o f 
Everyday Attention (TEA). Harcourt Assessment Inc.: San Antonio, Texas.
Robinson, T.E. & Berridge, K. C. (2003). Addiction. Annual Review o f Psychology, 
54, 25-53.
Rubia, K., Smith, A. B., Brammer, M. J. & Taylor, E. (2003). Right inferior
preffontal cortex mediates response inhibition while mesial preffontal cortex 
is responsible for error detection. Neuroimage, 20, 351-358.
Taylor, C. H. & John, J. L. (2004). Attentional and Memory Bias in Persecutory 
Delusions and Depression. Psychopathology, 37, 233-241.
89
Verheyden, S. L., Hadfield, J., Calin, T. & Curran, H.V. (2002). Sub-acute effects of 
MDMA (3,4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine, “ecstasy”) on mood: 
evidence of gender differences. Psychopharmacology, 161, 23-31.
Volkow, N. D., Fowler, J. S., Wolf, A. P., Hitzemann, R., Dewey, S. L., Bendriem, 
B., Alpert, R. & Hoff, A. (1991). Changes in brain glucose metabolism in 
cocaine dependence and withdrawal. American Journal o f Psychiatry, 149, 
621-626.
Volkow, N. D., Hitzemann, R., Wang, G. J., Fowler, J. S., Wolf, A. P., Dewey, S. L. 
& Handlesman, L. (1992). Long-term frontal brain metabolic changes in 
cocaine abusers. Synapse, 11, 184-190.
Volkow, N. D., Fowler, J. S., Wang, G. J., Hitzemann, R., Logan, J., Schyler, D. J., 
Dewey, S. L &Wolf, A. P. (1993). Decreased dopamine D2 receptor 
availability is associated with reduced frontal metabolism in cocaine abusers. 
Synapse, 14, 169-177.
Vollenweider, F. X., Gamma, A., Liechti, M. & Huber, T. (1998). Psychological and 
cardiovascular effects and short-term sequelae of MDMA (“ecstasy”) in 
MDMA-naive healthy volunteers. Neuropsychopharmacology, 19, 241-251.
Wechsler, D. (1997). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -  Third Edition (WAIS III). 
Harcourt Assessment Inc.: San Antonio, Texas.
90
White, F. J. & Kalivas, P. W. (1998). Neuroadaptations involved in amphetamine 
and cocaine addiction. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 51, 141-153.
91
Part 3 
Critical Appraisal
Critical Appraisal
This is the biggest piece of research I have ever undertaken and I have learned an 
enormous amount, both about the subject of drug use and addiction and about the 
process of conducting research. I had no previous background in drug research and no 
experience of working in specialist drug and alcohol services. The only time I had come 
across clients with issues around drug use was in a forensic placement, where the focus 
was on the links between drug use, mental illness and offending behaviour.
Through understanding the complexity and degree of physical change possible in the 
brain as a result of chronic substance use, I began to see how an individual can lose 
ability to have control over compulsive behaviour. On reflection, I realised I had 
implicitly absorbed a societal association between addictive behaviour and weakness, or 
lack of will-power. I could start to see how pervasive this attitude might be in relation to 
other areas such as over-eating where there might be a connection between natural 
variation in incentive salience to food, for example, and vulnerability to obesity.
The Journey 
Searching the literature
Having to plan the research at a detailed level was a daunting process. Where to start 
with an enormous literature base? Which lines of research were most important to 
follow? Who were influential figures; which papers were more marginal?
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In beginning to look at the literature on cocaine use and its effects, I realised there was a 
mountain of research. And yet, within this huge wealth of knowledge, I was surprised to 
find there was virtually no research into the recreational use of cocaine. As a member of 
the newspaper-reading public, I had seen reference to what appeared to be many 
findings about ecstasy, and its short- and long-term effects on mood. With cocaine 
having a much longer history, I expected there to be a similar research base on its 
recreational use. Not being able to find anything, I thought at first that perhaps I was 
missing something. Had I not been doing my searches properly? But it became clear 
that, for some reason, while there was a huge amount known about chronic cocaine use 
and addiction, there were almost no studies of non-dependent use. There seemed to be a 
strange silence on this area. It was as if recreational use of cocaine did not exist. This is 
despite the fact that survey research has been revealing increased recreational use of 
many drugs, including cocaine.
Attitudes to illicit drug use
I began to wonder if one of the reasons for this is an implicit belief by many researchers 
of cocaine being so addictive that social and controlled use is not possible. Some of the 
major researchers in this area seem to have a moralistic and judgemental stance about 
psychoactive drugs. For example, Volkow, who has headed numerous teams 
reasearching the effects of cocaine, is director of NIDA, the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, an American governmental organisation. In NIDA’s information pages on their 
website (www.nida.nih.gov) illicit drugs are not ‘used’, they are only ‘misused’ or 
‘abused’. People dependent on nicotine, are never referred to as nicotine abusers in 
research papers, and alcohol abusers are often compared with ‘social drinkers’. Yet, in
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one of Volkow’s paper’s (Volkow, Wang, Fowler et al., 1999) even college students 
talking about initial experiences of cocaine, and clearly not referring to problematic use 
such as is defined by DSM (APA, 1994), are referred to as cocaine ‘abusers’. Such 
language is in danger of confusing unsanctioned use (e.g. use of any drug defined as 
illicit; excessive drinking in pregnancy; drink-driving) with harmful use that impacts on 
the individual, their family and often society.
There is a stark contrast here with another harmful potentially compulsive and very 
damaging behaviour, gambling, which the British government has been actively trying 
to promote while targeting social cocaine use at ‘middle-class dinner parties’ for 
punishment.
Informational websites about psychoactive durgs are mainly produced by government 
bodies (e.g. the Department of Health) charities (e.g. DrugScope) or parental groups, 
that have a vested interest in demonising cocaine as a dangerous and extremely 
addictive drug. In the NIDA webpage that provides information about cocaine, the 
second sentence of the section on ‘effects’ reads:
“Common health effects include heart attacks, respiratory failure, strokes, and 
seizures.”
(NIDA, 2005a)
An acknowledgement that cocaine can be taken occasionally is immediately followed 
by a strongly-worded caution:
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“Cocaine use ranges from occasional use to repeated or compulsive use, with a 
variety of patterns between these extremes. Other than medical uses, there is no 
safe way to use cocaine. Any route of administration can lead to absorption of 
toxic amounts of cocaine, leading to acute cardiovascular or cerebrovascular 
emergencies that could result in sudden death.”
(NIDA, 2005b)
But presumably, if small non-toxic amounts are taken, it does not lead to acute 
cardiovascular or cerebrovascular emergencies whichever route is used. Or is that only 
if it is taken ‘medically’? In fact, a report leaked from the government in the week of 
my writing this thesis, reports that there is 1 death per 100,000 users of cocaine 
resulting from acute use, or 11 people in the last year. This contrasts with 6,000 deaths 
in the last year from acute and chronic alchohol use and 100,000 deaths from tobacco 
smoking.
Surely, understanding why the majority of people can have controlled, social use would 
contribute to our understanding of why some cannot manage controlled use? There is 
certainly a need for education, so that people can make more well-informed choices 
about what they put in their bodies. I wonder if the alarmist tone of much of the 
information produced is counterproductive. It seems at odds with the experiences of 
friends and acquaintances of mine who enjoy cocaine ‘sensibly’, perhaps on special 
occasions such as birthdays or holidays. I suspect that valuable information is in danger 
of being dismissed or ignored, when it is buried in such moralistic language and bias of 
emphasis.
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Such language can be contrasted with that of the few websites that have a more 
balanced approach. For example, Erowid, which combines information about the 
positive aspects of drugs with sensible harm-reduction advice. Their stated aim is to 
promote ‘respect and awareness’ of psychoactive substances by providing non- 
jdugemental information,
“...in ways that strengthen [people’s] understanding of themselves and provide 
insight into the complex choices faced by individuals and societies alike.”
(Erowid, 2000)
A need for qualitative understandings
After searcing for literature on recreational use of cocaine, almost the only papers I 
could find were reports of survey data. As useful as it is to know about prevalence, such 
surveys can only provide us with numbers of users, and sometimes also ‘most likely’ 
profiles, but tell us nothing about particular individuals’ understanding about why they 
take particular drugs.
I was disappointed to find that some surveys did not even distinguish between specific 
drugs, but simply lumped illicit substances together, and there certainly seemed to be a 
lack of qualitative information about experience, patterns of use, and effects in social 
use of cocaine.
In my study, I took the opportunity provided by the testing sessions to conduct brief 
interviews with participants in the cocaine group. This was an enriching and interesting 
part of the research process, because all the data from the quantitative part of the study
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was, for me, embedded with that knowledge of lived experience. I felt that participants 
in my study had trusted me with intimate aspects of themselves and I became aware that 
I wanted to produce a piece of work that respected their choices and did not somehow 
let them down by contributing to an alarmist and moralistic opinion. At the same time, I 
was aware that result showing potentially negative consequences of recreational cocaine 
use must be shared.
Learning about the neurobiology of addiction
In terms of the effects of cocaine use, I realised, then, that without a research base in 
social cocaine use, I could only start with understanding mechanisms of addiction and 
then attempt to situate recreational use as a ‘problematic’ phenomenon within this 
framework. This kind of approach implicitly assumes a continuum concept from no use, 
through to recreational use and to dependent use at the other extreme.
Understanding the neurobiology and processes of addiction in a relatively short space of 
time was a difficult task. For a long time, each new paper I read seemed to be embedded 
in a huge prior knowledge base that I had to try to become familiar with. Many were the 
papers I had to read and re-read in order to understand the most important areas in the 
neuropsychology of addiction.
One of the most pivotal parts of my reading was getting to grips with the Berridge and 
Robinson papers (1993; 2003) on ‘parsing reward’. These, more than any others, helped 
me to understand how tolerance and sensitisation can and do co-occur, and how 
conscious and unconscious processes combine to create powerful effects on behaviour. I
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think for the first time I was really able to understand how addiction can get to the point 
that the individual is not in control.
My post-training work will initally be in a forensic setting where there is a high level of 
co-morbid drug and alcohol abuse, which contributes both to relapses in mental illness 
and to offending behaviour. My deeper knowledge about reward processes, incentive 
sensitisation, and the effects of frontal lobe damage in chronic drug use will help me 
better to understand patients’ difficulties and to plan treatment. I can already see where I 
was involved in counterproductive work with patients on placement, and how I might 
do things differently in clinical work. For example, I was part of a group where film 
clips of drug use were used to stimulate discussion. I can see now the disadvantages of 
providing drug cues likely to activate incentive motivation without meaning to, and 
without being part of a planned programme of exposure.
Writing the dot probe programme
An important part of the study was to assess whether there was any evidence of 
incentive sensitisation in recreational users. Having read the studies by Mogg and 
Bradley and colleagues, a dot probe task seemed the most elegant and precise way to do 
this. We discussed the possibility of using words as the stimuli; words which were
s '
cocaine-related and non-cocaine related. One difficulty with this is finding sufficient 
stimuli related specifically to cocaine rather than a range of recreational drugs that did 
not also have other meanings (e.g. snort, cut, line, coke). Given the greater richness and 
immediacy of visual stimuli, we decided to use photgraphic stimuli, as I thought this 
would be more ecologically valid. I also thought it would be relatively easy to do using
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a digital camera. In fact, setting up items for the photographs was time-consuming. It 
was more difficult that I had anticipated to think of twenty ways of setting up cocaine 
stimuli sufficiently different that the pictures were not too repetitive. However, this did 
not turn out to be the most difficult part. When the dot probe task was first suggested, I 
naively thought the department had a programme that I could simply slot the pictures 
into. It turned out I was to write the programme myself, and this was quite a challenge.
One of the department’s research students (Celia Morgan) gave me some tips and 
directed me to the the DMDX website (DMDX, 2002), where instructions on dot probe 
programming devised by Forster and Forster are generoulsy freely available. To a 
novice in research, there seem to be many small snags, with big consequences, in setting 
up a study. My first problem here was that my computer operating system was too old 
to support the downloading of zip files needed for the programme. This was eventually 
solved by my buying a laptop, which would also be well-used in collecting the data. 
Unfortunately, my research grant did not cover the cost.
For someone with no prior programming experience whatsoever, learning how to do it 
from a website was not easy. Getting the pictures to come up simultaneously, in the 
correct positions on the screen , and getting it all to run, was frustratingly difficult. 
Pseudo-randomising the pairs so that each picture appeared an equal number of times on 
either side, and an equal number of times with the dot probe following it, and without 
the cocaine pictures or the probe appearing more than three times in a row on the same 
side (to avoid a response set) was a fiddly puzzle.
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Eventually the task was finished. It looked beautiful. Unfortunately, the results showed 
that it did not clearly distinguish cocaine users from controls. On a subjective measure 
of pictures ratings, the cocaine group rated the pictures as more arousing and more 
pleasant than the control group, which shows that the cocaine-related pictures had 
heightened salience for users. However, on the probe task, both groups were faster to 
respond to the probe when it followed on the side of a cocaine-related picture. My 
explanation of this is that the cocaine cues were also highly attention-grabbing for 
controls, but perhaps for different reasons, i.e. they were novel and more interesting in 
content that non-cocaine pictures. I had been careful to match the paired pictures for 
composition, but in retrospect it might have been better to match them for arousingness 
of content. However, this would have entailed a fairly exensive pilot study in order to 
rate degree of arousingness of many pictures in order choose pairs that matched.
Ethics
It is impossible currently to do laboratory studies in which cocaine is given to 
participants, so the only window of opportunity for a study like mine is to ask for 
recreational users to let me test them when they are under the influence of cocaine. I 
was able to confirm the presence or absence of the drug using both objective measure 
(urine analysis) as well as known signs (e.g. elevated pulse rate) and subjective effects 
ratings (e.g. shaking, temperature rise, tingling, rushing). For me there was an ethical 
question of whether I was encouraging people to take part in illegal activity. I had to 
make arrangements with individuals to come and test them at specific times, and so 
their use was linked to my testing. On the other hand, all participants were volunteers 
who used cocaine in a controlled non-dependent pattern, who were allowing me access
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to test them on a night of usual use. On balance I feel my own role in the procedure was 
justified in that it is, as far as I am aware, the only study so far to assess the acute effects 
of cocaine in a non-dependent group of users.
However, there were problems that resulted from the procedure I went through for 
gaining ethical approval. I had no wish to act unethically with regard to participants. 
Though I did not consider the concept of testing recreational users on a night they 
planned to use cocaine anyway to be unethical, my supervisor and I were unsure how 
the university ethics board might receive the idea. Therefore, my supervisor rang the 
chair of the ethics committee to discuss the project before it was well-advanced. She 
described the procedure planned for the research and the my supervisor and the chair 
agreed that it would be acceptable for us to request a simple extension of a previous 
study run by my supervisor with another research student. This outcome had the benefit 
of saving a great deal of time in making a new application.
I had some reservations about my lack of involvement in the process of approval for a 
project which I myself was carrying out. In retrospect, I feel I should have made a more 
detailed assessment of what the previous research involved, and what the extension of 
approval covered. Despite the time advantage of gaining approval in this way, there was 
also a disadvantage.
Being covered by an extension meant using the same participant information sheet used 
by the previous study, as this was the sheet seen and approved by the Ethics Committee. 
However, this information sheet did not cover all points of interest to the participants, 
and did not point out that they would be asked for urine samples. I had no interest in
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deceiving participants or persuading them to take part in something of which they did 
not have full knowledge. Therefore, was careful to provide verbally details not covered 
by the sheet. I had doubts about this being correct, but perhaps did not express them 
strongly enough to my supervisor who was confident that we had followed an 
acceptable procedure. In the planning stage of the project we did not envisage taking 
urine samples because of lack of resources (each screen costs £25). However, a 
commercial drug screen company then provided us with free screening kits which we 
used to give an objective index of drug use. It was an oversight of me and my 
supervisor that this information was not added to the information sheet and approved by 
the Ethics Committee.
All participants had frill information of what would take place, were allowed to have all 
questions answered and were made fully aware of what the testing sessions would 
involve. This information was given to potential participants in advance. If they 
indicated they would be happy to take part, they then contacted me to let me know when 
they were next taking cocaine. All participants were made aware that they were under 
no obligation to continue at any point if they changed their minds, and all participants 
signed the consent form twice, before the testing sessions, and in the case of the cocaine 
group, before taking cocaine on the first testing session. However, though the written 
information sheet stated that questions about drug-taking would be asked, and implied 
that the effects of drug-taking on variations in mood and concentration were of interest 
to the researchers, it did not specifically state that the focus of the study was on the 
effects of recreational cocaine. This information was clearly stated to each participant in 
the verbal explanation, but this would leave me vulnerable to any doubts that 
participants had been given enough information about the study should any of them feel
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negatively affected by taking part, and then make a complaint, with potential negative 
consequences for all parties involved. Fortunately, in the event, there were no such 
difficulties: all participants were happy with the information given and the testing 
procedures. I have learnt, though, that a clear, rigorous and unambiguous ethical 
application prodecure is intended both for the proper protection of participants and for 
the protection of all interested research parties. In future research I intend to follow the 
usual route for assessment of ethical standards by a committee scrutinising full written 
details of all aspects of the planned research, and to be fully involved at every step of 
the ethical procedure.
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Volunteer Information Sheet
A Study of Weekend and Weekday Variation in Mood and Concentration
Purpose:
I am inviting you to participate in a study which will look at how people’s mood varies 
over the week and whether mood affects concentration.
Although it is commonplace to talk of feeling happier at weekends (“That Friday 
Feeling”) as compared to the start of the week, it is unclear how people’s mood changes 
over the week. We know very little about whether such mood changes affect people’s 
ability to concentrate.
Volunteers are needed to help us learn more about these mood changes.
What’s involved?
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to fill in some questionnaires about your 
mood and to carry out some straightforward tests of concentration and memory on two 
separate occasions: on the weekend, and then four days later mid-week. On each 
occasion, there will be a brief interview and you will be asked for information on any 
alcohol or drug use that day, or any other factors that might have affected your mood 
and concentration.
All your identifying details will be kept entirely confidential.
If you have any questions you would like to ask relating to the study, feel free to do so 
now.
Investigators:
Libby Bamardo & Professor Val Curran 
Sub-Dept of Clinical-Health Psychology 
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not wish to. If you decide to take 
part, you may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason.
All proposals for research using human participants are reviewed by an ethics 
committee before they can proceed. This proposal was reviewed by UCL Ethics 
Committee.
University College London 
Consent Form
ID No.___
Project Title:
A Study of Weekend and Week day Mood and Concentration
Yes No
Have you read the Participant Information Sheet?
Have you received enough information about the study?
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study at any 
stage?
Do you understand that your participation is completely confidential?
Signed:....................................................................  Date:
Full name in capitals:................................................................
Signature of Witness:...........................................  Date:
Full name in capitals:................................................................
Comment or concerns during the study
If you have any comments or concerns you should discuss these with the Principal 
Researcher (Prof Val Curran, Sub-dept of Clinical Health Psychology, UCL,  
. If you wish to go further and complain about any aspect of the way you 
have been approached or treated during the course of the study, you should email the 
Head of the Graduate School  who will take the complaint 
forward as necessary.
No. Date Day
Picture Ratings
Please rate on scale of 0 -9 the level of arousal and level of pleasantness each picture invokes. 
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